Following Amir and Grilo (1999), we characterize a class of demand functions that generate constant quantity best-response functions. We examine implications of constant best-response functions for the invariance of equilibrium outcomes with respect to the assumed market structure of quantity games. We argue that, unlike the class of linear demand functions, this class of demand functions supports the pure interpretation of Cournot conjectures.
Introduction
Perhaps the major difficulty with empirical research related to oligopoly theory is that equilibrium market outcomes tend to be highly sensitive to changing the order of decision making by firms in an industry and/or changing the equilibrium concept (i.e., market structure). A natural question to ask is whether there exist demand functions in which the resulting market equilibrium outcomes are invariant with respect to the assumed market structure. Amir and Grilo (1999, p. 9) demonstrated the existence of a class of demand functions for which the resulting best-response functions are constant in quantity oligopoly games. The desired invariance to the impact of the order of decisions in quantity oligopoly games on market outcomes immediately follows.
From a theoretical point of view, the Cournot market structure may have two interpretations associated with two different assumptions concerning firms' expectations. The widely-used (weak) interpretation is that a Cournot equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) in the sense that each firm expects the other firm to maintain a constant output level. Clearly, these expectations are consistent only in equilibrium, at least for linear demand functions. However, a stronger interpretation of Cournot equilibrium is to assume that firms expect rival firms to have constant best-response functions. In contrast with linear demand functions, the class of demand functions identified in this paper is consistent with the strong interpretation of Cournot conjectures. In fact, strategic games may have several interpretations; see for example Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 2.1.2) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies the class of demand functions yielding constant best-response functions. Section 3 demonstrates that the realization of output levels is invariant with respect to changing from Cournot to Stackelberg quantity-setting market structures. Section 4 concludes with a general discussion and demonstrates how, in contrast with linear demand functions, this class of demand functions supports the pure interpretation of Cournot conjectures. 
Demand Functions Yielding Constant Best-Response Functions
q , the set of maximizers is given by:
. A best-response function is said to be constant if there exists a constant Amir and Grilo (1999, p. 9) , we formalize the existence of this class of functions in the following proposition. Proposition 1. There exists a class of downward-sloping market demand functions for which the corresponding best-response functions are constant. Formally, this class of demand functions is given by: The first-order condition is given by:
Hence,
is an extremum point. Since the local second-order condition satisfies:
and upon checking the graph of i π (as a function of i q ) we see this local maximum happens to be the global maximum over (0, ) ∞ at i q β = . Observe that: Therefore, the best-response correspondence is a function.
We have shown that producing output level β constitutes a dominant strategy of any firm.
Equilibrium Oligopoly Market Outcomes
We now solve for the equilibrium market outcomes under Cournot and Stackelberg market structures.
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Cournot, 1838 ) is an outcome
Clearly, in this environment, the unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium is 
That is, the leader solves for the followers' best-response functions and chooses its output level accordingly. Followers behave in a Cournot fashion by simply following their best-response functions.
Note that once we know that
is the unique dominant strategy of every firm i , it immediately follows that equilibria in any of the following three scenarios yield identical output decisions. (a) The leader moves first, while the other 1 − N firms move simultaneously as followers. (b) All N firms move sequentially and one at a time. (c) All N firms move simultaneously. Hence, the order of output determination does not influence output level decisions. Thus, the order-invariance result derived for this specific market demand function constitutes the major strength of the present model. Moreover, for this reason, we deliberately refrained from defining the Stackelberg market structure as a specific (ad hoc) extensive-form game. This is because our result is more general in the sense that it may apply to sequential games which cannot be represented by a conventional tree but still have some normal-form representations. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The realization of output levels is invariant with respect to the choice of Cournot and Stackelberg market structures.
It is interesting to point out that for this particular inverse-demand function, each firm can consider itself to be a Stackelberg leader in the sense that it solves the maximization problem (2), while firms' conjectures maintain mutual consistency. This invalidates a common perception that, in a Stackelberg market structure when there are two firms, there is no equilibrium when both firms view themselves as leaders (e.g., Kreps, p. 330) . Moreover, our result is related to the endogenous-timing papers, such as Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Grilo (1999) , which obtain in a more general setting the possibility that both firms will choose their output level at the same time (i.e., a simultaneous game). Here, we demonstrate the possibility of having a complete invariance with respect to the order of moves in the absence of production costs. In the presence of production costs, it is clear that for sufficiently-high production costs at least one firm will choose not to produce in which case the order of moves may affect market outcome.
Interpreting Cournot: A Discussion
From a theoretical point of view, we would like to point out the following. functions. Our interpretation of Cournot is based on Cournot's system of two equations given in Cournot (1927, Ch. 7, p. 66) , which can be written using our notation and for 2 = N as:
Equation ( is a dominant action of firm 2.
Therefore, our interpretation of Cournot's conjecture is that (3) and (4) hold as identities independently of each other. In contrast, the common interpretation is to require that this system of equations holds in equilibrium, in which case the Cournot conjecture about rival firms holding their output constant is inconsistent with firms' having downward-sloping best-response functions.
Finally, various authors (e.g., Bergstrom and Varian, 1985) have attempted to facilitate empirical research in oligopoly markets using simple Cournot market structures. The class of demand functions characterized in this note has significant implications for empirical research. This is because econometric models based on a demand function in the class identified by (1) can have strong predictive power since the market outcome is invariant with respect to the assumed market structure. This means that, in these markets, applied economists do not have to search across sequential dynamic games in order to find a particular ad hoc order of moves which best fits the data.
